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Dodd-Frank’s Extension of
Criminal Corporate Liability
through the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act: Enabling
Whistleblowers and Monitoring
Conflict Minerals
Tim Bakken
I. Introduction: New Crimes and Proving Old Crimes
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”)1 has been characterized as
the most significant financial reform legislation since the Great
Depression,2 when the nation adopted the Securities Act of
19333 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.4 The Dodd* The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department
of Defense, or the U.S. government.
1. See generally Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter DoddFrank Act].
2. As one commentator has suggested:
Dodd-Frank represents the most sweeping changes to the
financial regulatory environment in the United States since
the Great Depression. While its enactment was important,
it is seriously flawed. It does not deal with regulatory
fragmentation, sidesteps international coordination, and is
overly optimistic in dealing with too-big-to-fail. Going first
doesn’t mean you get it right.
Edward F. Greene, Dodd-Frank and the Future of Financial Regulation, 2
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 79, 79 (2011), http://www.hblr.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/HBLR-Greene_Symposium1.pdf.
3. See generally Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2012)).
4. See generally Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78pp (2012)).
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Frank Act makes so many changes and leaves so much rulemaking to the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)
that a generation will probably pass before its implications are
understood. In the criminal area, the Dodd-Frank Act creates
new crimes5 – twenty-two by one estimate6 – and also makes
recklessness the mens rea for several crimes,7 creating greater
liability for lesser culpability when compared to crimes whose
mens rea element is intent or willfulness.
Specifically, the Dodd-Frank Act provides lucrative
financial incentives for corporate agents who reveal

5. See e.g., Dodd-Frank Act §§ 723, 124 Stat. at 1675 (to be codified at 7
U.S.C. § 2) (clearing), 724, 124 Stat. at 1682, 1684 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C.
§§ 6s, 6d) (swaps, segregation, and bankruptcy treatment), 725, 124 Stat. at
1685 (repealed 2015) (derivatives clearing), 728, 124 Stat. at 1697 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 24a) (swap data repositories), 730, 124 Stat. at 1702 (to
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6t) (large swap trader reporting), 731, 124 Stat. at
1703 (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6s) (registration and regulation of swap
dealers, and major swap participants), 741, 124 Stat. at 1730-31 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6b-1) (enforcement), 745, 124 Stat. at 1735 (repealed
2015) (enhanced compliance by registered entities), 746, 124 Stat. at 1738 (to
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c) (insider trading), 747, 124 Stat. at 1739 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6c) (antidisruptive practices authority), 749 (to be
codified at 7 U.S.C. § 6d) (conforming amendments), 753, 124 Stat. at 1750 (to
be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 9) (anti-manipulation authority), 763, 124 Stat. at
1762, 1768-69, 1774, 1777-79, 1781 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c-3, 78c4, 78c-5, 78f, 78i, 78j-2, 78m) (amendments to the Securities Exchange Act),
764, 124 Stat. at 1785 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-10) (registration and
regulation of security-based swap dealers and major security-based swap
participants), 768, 124 Stat. at 1800-01 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b)
(amendments to the Securities Act and treatment of security-based swaps),
929, 124 Stat. at 1852 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78g) (unlawful margin
lending), 929l, 124 Stat. at 1861 (to be codified 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78j, 78o)
(enhanced applications of antifraud provisions), 929x, 124 Stat. at 1870 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78) (short sale reforms), 975, 124 Stat. at 1916 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4) (regulations of municipal securities and changes
to the board of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board), 1031, 124 Stat.
at 2005 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531) (prohibiting unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices), 1036, 124 Stat. at 2010 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5536) (prohibited acts), 1472, 124 Stat. at 2187, 2190 (to be codified at §§
1604, 1639e) (appraisal independence requirements).
6. See generally Tiffany M. Joslyn, Criminal Provisions in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, FEDERALIST SOC’Y,
(Dec.
10,
2010),
http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/criminalprovisions-in-the-dodd-frank-wall-street-reform-consumer-protection-act.
7. See Dodd-Frank Act § 745, 124 Stat. at 1735 (repealed 2015); see also
id. §§ 746, 753, 124 Stat. at 1738, 1750 (to be at codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6c(a),
9).
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wrongdoing within corporations.8
Also, the Act’s conflict
minerals provision requires companies to issue reports that
describe their production of valuable minerals in several
African nations, where the rule of law is often not observed. 9
The new provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act provide the
government with new methods of monitoring corporations and
finding what might be the vastly understated and largely
concealed practice of corporations rewarding foreign officials
for access to markets in foreign nations.10
The Dodd-Frank Act creates and criminalizes a new kind
of insider trading, in which federal employees are prohibited
from releasing government information,11 an intangible kind of
interest similar to the property interest in some insider trading
cases.12 This provision may raise significant questions, even
First Amendment constitutional questions, in that it
criminalizes the release and/or use of government information,
always a suspect proposition in a democracy.13 This newly
protected government information elevates, in essence, not only
government documents but also discussions undertaken by
government employees about public companies and other
business entities to the level of classified information, which is
also criminalized.14 Moreover, unlike insider trading involving
corporate information, where generally only the fiduciary and
his tippee are liable,15 anyone who trades on government
information, regardless of how far removed from the tipper, is
liable.16
The extraterritorial provisions17 of the Dodd-Frank Act
appear to expand jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
8. See id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)).
9. See id. §§ 1502(p), 1504(p), 124 Stat. at 2213, 2220, invalidated by
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
10. See generally Mike Koelher, Archive for the ‘Dodd-Frank’ Category,
FCPA Professor (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/doddfrank.
11. Dodd-Frank Act § 746, 124 Stat. at 1738.
12. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
13. Dodd-Frank Act § 746, 124 Stat. at 1738.
14. Id.
15. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
16. See Dodd-Frank Act § 746, 124 Stat. at 1738.
17. See id. § 746, 124 Stat. at 1738.; see also id. § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at
1864-65 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v, 78aa, 80b-14).

3

4

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:1

thus negate Morrison v. National Australia Bank, in which the
United States Supreme Court held that securities must be
listed in the United States or the activities at issue in the case
must have occurred in the United States before a federal court
may assert jurisdiction.18 Despite its focus on new and old
crimes, the Dodd-Frank Act pays little attention to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”),19 the epitome of
extraterritorial jurisdiction, which remains intact. As will be
discussed below, however, the effect of the Dodd-Frank Act is to
expand the reach of the FCPA, not through new statutes or
rules directly focused on the FCPA, but rather through new
provisions that indirectly enhance the ability of the Justice
Department to prosecute bribery and the SEC to enforce the
accounting, books, and records requirements of the FCPA.
One key, compelling component that produces a more
potent FCPA is the Dodd-Frank Act’s creation of rewards for
whistleblowers,20 who are usually insiders and who possess the
requisite information about illegal corporate activity to make
prosecutions of the FCPA possible. A second key component in
the Dodd-Frank Act is its requirement that firms make specific
disclosures about their payments to governments in regard to
“conflict minerals”21 in Africa, the trade of which has fostered
regional warfare for decades. The additional information
obtained from such disclosures will support bribery
prosecutions. Where Dodd-Frank Act disclosures are not made,
lied about, or covered up, the government will be in a better
position to enter into cooperation agreements with witnesses
and investigate bribery in an alternative way.
In a sense, through its whistleblower provision, the DoddFrank Act has enabled the government to use corporate
employee whistleblowers to support criminal prosecutions.
That position finds agreement in this article, but the conclusion
reached is that the results to be obtained from the
18. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
19. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95213, 91 Stat. 1494 [hereinafter FCPA] (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
78dd-1-78dd-3 (2012)).
20. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841 (noting that the
whistleblowing provision permits a recovery of 10-30% for the whistleblower).
21. See Dodd-Frank Act § 1502, 124 Stat. at 2215-17, invalidated by
Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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whistleblower provision will be positive. Through an analysis
of the Dodd-Frank Act, this article discusses further the new
reach of the FCPA, particularly in light of the whistleblower
and conflict-minerals provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act.
Finally, this article concludes that although the new provisions
can be costly, the provisions are beneficial. The traditional
corporate model is now more open, as firms and individuals are
required to act with greater care and, in effect, the FCPA has
greater vitality.
II. Dodd-Frank’s Whistleblower and the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act
Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank Act22 is titled
“Whistleblower Protection” and defines a whistleblower as “any
individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation
of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner
established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”23 The
provision provides a compelling incentive to individuals to
report securities violations because it offers a reward of 10-30%
“of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related
actions.”24 On May 25, 2011, the SEC issued final rules to
implement the whistleblower statute.25 Under the rules, “[t]o
be considered for an award, the SEC’s rules require that a
whistleblower must voluntarily provide the SEC with original
information that leads to the successful enforcement by the
SEC or a federal court or administrative action in which the
SEC obtains monetary sanctions totaling more than $1
million.”26 In explaining the rationale for the whistleblower
statute and rules, former SEC Chairman Mary L. Shapiro
22. Id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
23. Id. § 922(a)(6), 124 Stat. at 1841.
24. Id. § 922(b)(1)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. at 1841.
25. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Adopts Rules to Establish
Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011) (on file with author),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-116.htm
(“The
new
SEC
whistleblower program, implemented under Section 922 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, is primarily intended to reward individuals who act early to expose
violations and who provide significant evidence that helps the SEC bring
successful cases.”).
26. Id.
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suggested that “[f]or an agency with limited resources like the
SEC, it is critical to be able to leverage the resources of people
who may have first-hand information about violations of the
securities laws.”27 The government concedes that it does not
have the resources to regulate securities markets and will rely
on whistleblowers, who in the main will be the employees of
corporations who possess the first-hand information that will
lead to rewards.
A. Dodd-Frank and Corporate Culture
The new whistleblower statute could change workplace
dynamics. If firms are concerned during the hiring process
about which employee might become a whistleblower, they may
investigate job candidates’ prior activities more thoroughly and
differently. Trust inside companies could be diminished if
fellow employees of a potential whistleblower fear their
innocent activities will be misconstrued and reported to
government regulators.
Especially regarding the FCPA,
companies’ pursuit of promising leads in developing markets
overseas may be restrained if the companies believe their
activities could be misconstrued. It is the unleashing of private
agents to do government work for a reward that concerns the
business community, corporate compliance officers, and whitecollar criminal lawyers.
In perhaps grudging acknowledgement of the reach of the
Dodd-Frank Act, one prominent law firm, Fried Frank,
pronounced the whistleblower statute a “sleeper bounty
provision” and predicted “that this new whistleblower program
may end up playing a key role in identifying and prosecuting
violations of the FCPA.”28 From a criminal defense perspective,
the whistleblower statute and rules will give additional force to
the FCPA, which even today is murky for lack of judicial
interpretation. Indeed, the two essential parts of the FCPA,

27. Id.
28. Memorandum from Fried Frank to the Friends and Clients of Fried
Frank (July 16, 2010) [hereinafter Fried Frank] (on file with author),
http://friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications/A97331BB3E441A079E01314A96
8EECD7.pdf.
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requiring certain books and records to be maintained29 and
prohibiting bribery of foreign officials,30 have led to significant
judicial construction. Most relevant to this article is the
bribery provision, which states:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer . . . or for any
officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer
or any stockholder . . . to make use of the mails
or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the
payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of
value to . . . any foreign official for purposes of . .
. influencing any act or decision of such foreign
official in his official capacity.31
Agreeing with the defense bar, one commentator finds the
elements of the FCPA lacking in specificity32 and recommends
that the SEC or the Department of Justice define more
precisely the meaning of “foreign official;” what constitutes an
“agency or instrumentality of a foreign government;” whether
“anything of value” includes charitable contributions or
payments made to people other than the foreign official; and “to
what extent . . . securing an overall business advantage
constitute[s] ‘obtaining or retaining business’ for purposes of
the Act.”33
Especially with whistleblower incentives so high,34 most
seem to believe that prosecutions under the FCPA and other

29. See FCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 102(b), 91 Stat. at 1494, invalidated
by Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
30. See id. § 103(a), 91 Stat. at 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-1(a) (2012)).
31. Id. § 103(a)(1)(A)(i), 91 Stat. at 1494.
32. See generally Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement,
Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489 (2011).
33. Id. at 576.
34. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922(b)(1)(A)-(B), 124 Stat.
1376, 1841 (2010) (permitting a 10-30% of recovery for whistleblowers).

7

8

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:1

statutes will increase.35 “One anticipated result of the new
whistleblower program may be an increase in the number of
investigations and prosecutions under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act . . . which at the same time raises concerns that
corporate employees may be tempted to forego their own
internal compliance programs.”36 In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act
does not require whistleblowers to climb any ladder, go up any
chain of command, or report to any supervisor. They may go
directly to the SEC.37 Under the Dodd-Frank Act:
In any covered judicial or administrative action
. . . the Commission . . . shall pay an award or
awards to 1 or more whistleblowers who
voluntarily provided original information to the
Commission that led to the successful
enforcement of the covered judicial or
administrative action, or related action, in an
aggregate amount equal to . . . not less than 10
percent, in total, of what has been collected of the
monetary sanctions imposed in the action or
related actions; and . . . not more than 30
percent, in total.38
In response, corporate and defense attorneys argue that the
Dodd-Frank Act should have required employees to report their
perceived violation to corporate compliance officers before they
could report to the SEC and recover a reward, which would
permit corporations to make corrections at a low cost.
This view is slightly optimistic, even whimsical, in that
prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, there were virtually no
whistleblower reports whatsoever. “Since its inception in 1989,
the SEC’s existing whistleblower program has paid out less

35. See generally Henry Klehm III et al., Securities Enforcement Has
Crossed the Border: Regulatory Authorities Respond to the Financial Crisis
with a Call for Greater International Cooperation, But Where Will That
Lead?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 927 (2011).
36. Id. at 936.
37. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
38. Id. § 922 (b)(1)(A)-(B), 124 Stat. at 1841.
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than $160,000 to just five whistleblowers.”39
From this
minimal whistleblower activity, one could conclude that
corporate compliance programs were effective, in that
whistleblowers had little about which to complain. Further,
from the firms’ perspectives, if potential whistleblower
employees did have a complaint, compliance officers could
address it and, if needed, find a remedy inside the firm.
However, argued differently, the corporate compliance
programs deterred whistleblowers through assimilation,
conformity, and fear. No employee will step forward without
significant protection or incentives. Without a Dodd-Frank
Act-type whistleblower law and little prospect of compensation
for reporting even verified securities law violations,
whistleblower employees had no incentive to report violations.
And they did not, except for only five over twenty years.40
B. Cooperating Witnesses and Whistleblowers
The government at all levels has long used cooperating
witnesses to initiate and support criminal prosecutions,
providing to the cooperator leniency in charging and
sentencing.41 Almost always less reliable, at least on the
surface, and far more culpable than whistleblowers,42
39. Fried Frank, supra note 28 (citing S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 111 (2010)
(Conf. Rep.)). Continuing:
In response to those statistics — which may have resulted
from would-be whistleblowers weighing harsh reprisals
against the prospect of low rewards for raising concerns
about wrongdoing in a corporation — Congress included in
the Dodd-Frank Act a minimum cash reward of 10% of any
monetary sanctions recovered by the government to
encourage individuals “to take the enormous risk of blowing
the whistle in calling attention to fraud.” The government’s
failure to detect Bernie Madoff’s fraud also spurred the SEC
to endorse a more expansive whistleblower program.
Id. (citations omitted).
40. See id.
41. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2011).
42. Whistleblowers may have no culpability. They cannot receive a
financial award for a criminal conviction related to their whistleblowing. See
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cooperators are pervasive in the criminal justice system. The
government formally recognizes and rewards their
participation in ways far more important than the receipt of
money. Cooperation usually results in significantly less time in
prison. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Upon motion of the government stating that the
defendant has provided substantial assistance in
the investigation or prosecution of another
person who has committed an offense, the court
may depart from the guidelines. . . . The
appropriate reduction shall be determined by the
court for reasons stated that may include . . . the
significance and usefulness of the defendant’s
assistance . . . the truthfulness, completeness,
and reliability of any information or testimony
provided by the defendant . . . the nature and
extent of the defendant’s assistance . . . any
injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to
the defendant or his family resulting from his
assistance . . . the timeliness of the defendant’s
assistance.43
A whistleblower normally should be met with far less alarm
than a cooperator. The cooperator is by nature a criminal. If
not, there would be no need for a cooperation agreement in
which the cooperator agrees to testify for a benefit. For all
other persons, the government can simply subpoena them to
testify, assuming they do not have a Fifth Amendment or
common law privilege not to testify.
It is far more difficult for a whistleblower to obtain a
financial reward than for a cooperating criminal to obtain
leniency. There is no statutory limit on the cooperators that
the government may use, nor the leniency they may receive.44
Sammy “the Bull” Gravano received immunity from
prosecution for nineteen murders and five years’ imprisonment
Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
43. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2011).
44. See id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss1/1

10

2015

DODD-FRANK’S EXTENSION

11

in satisfaction of all his crimes in return for his testimony
against John Gotti and other members of organized crime.45 In
contrast, the Dodd-Frank Act denies an award to:
[A]ny whistleblower who is convicted of a
criminal violation related to the judicial or
administrative
action
for
which
the
whistleblower otherwise could receive an award
under this section . . . [and] to any whistleblower
who fails to submit information to the
Commission in such form as the Commission
may, by rule, require.46
The SEC goes even further. In its rule47 implementing the
whistleblower provision of the Dodd-Frank Act,48 the SEC
prevents whistleblowers from recovery “if he or she obtained
the information by a means or in a manner that is determined
by a United States court to violate applicable Federal or state
criminal law.”49 This rule will doubtlessly eliminate some
whistleblowers, but it requires that the whistleblowers who do
survive the rule to have relatively clean hands, unlike those of
cooperators.
It is likely that a cooperator will have, at some point,
withheld information from the government, but he may,
nonetheless, enter into a cooperation agreement. In contrast,
under the Dodd-Frank Act, a whistleblower “who fails to
submit information to the Commission” will not receive an
award.50 By nature, a whistleblower is more reliable than a
cooperator and is unlikely to have any criminal convictions. He
is not blowing the whistle to avoid imprisonment on a current
criminal case where, because of the travails of imprisonment,

45. See James Ridgway de Szigethy, J. R.’s Mafia Year in Review – 2000,
AM. MAFIA (Jan. 2001), http://americanmafia.com/feature_articles_111.html.
46. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1841.
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(1)(iv) (2015).
48. Dodd-Frank Act § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
49. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-64545,
at 79-80 (May 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf.
50. Id. at 133 n.293.
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the cooperator has more incentive to fabricate and lie than
probably any person in society.
Unlike the cooperator, who executes a binding contract
with the prosecution detailing the terms of the cooperation and
benefits, the whistleblower has no assurance that the SEC will
pursue his leads or charges or award him any financial benefit
for providing “information relating to a ‘material’ violation of
the securities laws.”51 Cooperators pervade the criminal justice
system. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, they may not recover if
they are convicted of a crime related to their whistleblowing.52
Under SEC rules, they may not recover if they obtained their
information through criminal means.53 So long as there are
reasons for the government to use cooperators, there will be a
greater rationale to use whistleblowers.
C. A Place for Whistleblowers
Recent history and cases support the view that
whistleblowers are needed if the government is to effectively
enforce the FCPA. The Department of Justice enforces the
bribery component of the FCPA, and the SEC enforces the
accounting and records component:
The accounting and record-keeping provisions of
the FCPA are essentially a re-enactment of
established accounting procedures for publicly
traded companies. As such the accounting and
record-keeping provisions of the FCPA are
enforced by the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC). Penalties for violating the accounting and
record-keeping provisions of the FCPA are the
same penalties that apply to most other
violations of the securities laws. These penalties
include monetary fines but no criminal
penalties.54
51. Id. at 9 (citations omitted).
52. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. at 1841.
53. Id. § 922(c)(2)(C), 124 Stat. at 1841.
54. Margaret Gatti et al., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Mar. 26, 2008),
available at http://library.findlaw.com/1997/Jan/1/126234.html.
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As things stand now, the government, either the Department of
Justice or the SEC, may be plucking only a few prominent
cases at the top point of a pyramid that has a huge base. In
2009, the SEC created a unit devoted to enforcement of the
FCPA,55 and in 2011 the SEC for the first time indicated the
number of FCPA enforcement actions that the agency brought,
which had been previously subsumed within another
The number was fifteen.57
The number of
category.56
enforcement actions in 2012, 2013, and 2014 were ten, eight,
and eight, respectively.58
These seem like relatively few enforcement actions in light
of the significant FCPA cases that have been brought by the
Justice Department or SEC in just one year, for example:
In 2010, the U.S. Department of Justice . . . and
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission . .
. agreed to settle charges against: (1) the Dutch
construction company Snamprogetti Netherlands
B.V. for $ 365 million; (2) the French
construction and engineering firm Technip SA
for $ 338 million; (3) U.K. defense contractor
BAE Systems PLC for $ 400 million; (4) German
automaker Daimler AG for $ 185 million; and the
global freight forwarding company Panalpina
World Transport (Holding) Ltd., along with six
other companies in the oil services industry, for a
total of $ 236.5 million.59
Also in 2010, Citigroup and Blackstone were among the ten
firms that the SEC was reportedly investigating in connection

55. Robert Khuzami, Director, Div. of Enf’t, SEC, Remarks Before the
New York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5,
2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm.
56. See
SEC
Enforcement
Actions:
FCPA
Cases,
SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited July 28, 2015)
[hereinafter SEC Enforcement Actions].
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Westbrook, supra note 32, at 492-94.
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with a FCPA bribery inquiry concerning officials and sovereign
wealth funds.60 Unless human nature has improved suddenly
and bribery has been cut in half, the declining numbers of
enforcement actions – just eight in 2014 – may indicate that
the SEC has been overwhelmed by the Dodd-Frank Act.61
Just previous to 2010, in 2008 and 2009 FCPA cases,
Seimens AG agreed to pay the government a fine of over $800
million and Halliburton settled with the government for $579
million.62 From 2008 to 2010, at least forty-one persons were
arrested, indicted, or convicted of violating the FCPA.63 One
was sentenced to eighty-seven months, “the longest prison term
ever imposed for an FCPA violation.”64
Companies and
individuals endure significant costs in violating the FCPA.
But, if the costs are high, this leads to the question of why the
violations occur in the first place. Indeed, the corporate
violations occurred within established business structures and
were pervasive.65 The most plausible reason that firms take
great risks in violating the FCPA is that the risk of getting
caught is low.
The concerns that the Dodd-Frank Act will adversely affect
corporate compliance programs, if true, seem less relevant and
slightly misplaced in light of the large recoveries obtained
recently from very large, established firms.66 Perhaps the
compliance programs should be affected. Compliance programs
are not preventing significant violations of the FCPA and
extensive liability for the firms that the programs are designed
to protect. Moreover, the SEC is not bringing a large number
of cases under the FCPA, with only twenty brought in 2010. 67
It is fair to ask whether many corporations do not have
effective compliance programs or whether their programs exist
60. Dionne Searcey & Randall Smith, SEC Probes Banks, Buyout Shops
Over Dealings With Sovereign Funds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 14, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704307404576080403625366
100.html.
61. See SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 56.
62. See Westbrook, supra note 32, at 556.
63. See id. at 526-29.
64. Id. at 527
65. See generally id.
66. See generally Fried Frank, supra note 28.
67. See SEC Enforcement Actions, supra note 56.
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as a means to shield them from liability by permitting them to
disclaim the mens rea of intent, knowledge, and/or willfulness
if the government brings prosecutions or enforcement actions
against them. “The FCPA prohibits not only direct payments
to foreign officials, but also payments to third parties if they
are made ‘while knowing’ that some or all of the payment will
be used for bribery in contravention of the FCPA.”68
Compliance programs may relieve firms from having
knowledge imputed to them in FCPA cases, even though the
corporate culture may not deter violations of the FCPA.
There is some evidence that corporations attempt to shield
themselves from FCPA liability by working through
intermediaries. Prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, “[l]iability for the
acts of intermediaries [was] at an all-time high in terms of
importance: all eleven enforcement actions against companies
in 2009 involved some type of foreign-agent conduct.”69 If
operating in bad faith, corporations could try to avoid liability
by claiming they could not anticipate that rouge employees who
received FCPA compliance training would engage in bribery.
However, the Dodd-Franks Act’s explicit recognition of
recklessness as a basis for criminal liability may force
compliance programs to foster a corporate culture of greater
oversight.70
The concern that the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower
provision will lead employees to complain amok seems
overstated. Regardless of legal protection for whistleblowers,
for personal and professional reasons, almost no employee
wants to be a whistleblower.
Being a whistleblower is
emotionally taxing and can be financially harmful. Even if a
firm cannot terminate a whistleblower, the firm’s other
employees will understand from management’s subtle, unprovable signals that their association with the employeewhistleblower will be costly. The whistleblower will work in
silence. The whistleblower’s opportunities within the firm, as
well as firms in the same industry, not to mention elsewhere,
will likely be non-existent.
Without a reward for
68. Westbrook, supra note 32, at 544.
69. Id. at 545.
70. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 745, 124 Stat. 1376, 1735
(2010) (repealed 2015); see also id. §§ 746, 753, 124 Stat. at 1738, 1750.
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whistleblowers like that in the Dodd-Frank Act, few employees
would come forward to complain.
To corporations, general counsel, and outside defense
attorneys, the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision71 may
seem potent now only because there is virtually no enforcement
stemming from whistleblowers in the past against which to
compare. The SEC called fiscal year 2014 “historic” because it
made awards to nine whistleblowers, the highest of which was
$30 million, compared to only five previous such awards.72 The
SEC also reported that the number of tips it received from 2011
through 2014 increased from 334 to 3,620.73 This is a
significant increase in reporting, but still the number of
whistleblower awards is very low given the number of reports.
The influence of the Dodd-Frank Act remains to be seen
because the SEC might have too few resources to properly
enforce the statute’s provisions.
Thus, given the scarcity of complaints, at least until the
Dodd-Frank Act, and the relatively few enforcement actions
and recoveries, a fear of false whistleblower complaints would
seem overstated. Moreover, a corporation and its employees
should have no internal conflict among employees if the
whistleblower stays at or returns to a firm because the DoddFrank Act prohibits retaliation.74
Protection against
retaliation did not exist in the past, an absence that almost
certainly deterred virtually every employee in the twenty years
prior to the Dodd-Frank Act from stepping forward as a
whistleblower.
D. Whistleblowers Serving as Cooperating Witnesses
Some of the largest and most prestigious companies are
implicated in FCPA violations, but only when discovered.75
There is no evidence to show that without substantial, new
71. See id. § 922, 124 Stat. at 1841.
72. OFFICE OF THE WHISTLEBLOWER, SEC, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM, at 1 (2014),
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2014.pdf.
73. Id. at 20.
74. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1), 124 Stat. at 1841.
75. See Searcey & Smith, supra note 60.
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whistleblower activity, violations of the FCPA will subside.
Further, in their treatment and relations with employees and
insiders who blow the whistle or cooperate with the
government, corporations will have to evolve. In addition to
rewarding whistleblowers, the Dodd-Frank Act also protects
them. This is not to say that a whistleblower will want to
retain his job given the atmosphere he might experience back
among fellow employees, but he will have that option, which is
necessary for the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision to
be successful. That is, the SEC will not pursue the allegations
of all whistleblowers, in which case they will have to return to
work, sometimes identified as a whistleblower.
Accordingly, in authorizing private civil actions, section
922 of the Dodd-Frank Act creates significant liability for firms
and its agents who retaliate against a whistleblower:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in any
other
manner
discriminate
against,
a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by
the whistleblower . . . in initiating, testifying in,
or assisting in any investigation or judicial or
administrative action of the Commission based
upon or related to such information . . . An
individual who alleges discharge or other
discrimination. . .may bring an action . . . in the
appropriate district court of the United States
for. . . reinstatement with the same seniority
status that the individual would have had, but
for the discrimination . . . 2 times the amount of
back pay otherwise. . .owed to the individual,
with interest; and compensation for litigation
costs, expert witness fees, and reasonable
attorneys’ fees.76
The Act does not indicate that a whistleblower’s remedy is
limited to section 922.
76. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(A)(ii), (B)(i), (C), 124 Stat. at 1841.
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Perhaps more significantly, because the whistleblower is
reporting to a federal agency, the retaliating firm or agent
could face criminal liability for its retaliation, such as for
obstruction of justice.77 The applicable obstruction statute
provides that “[w]hoever corruptly, or by threats . . . influences,
obstructs, or impedes . . . the due and proper administration of
the law under which any pending proceeding is being had
before any department or agency of the United States . . .
[s]hall be fined . . . [or] imprisoned not more than 5 years.”78
The statute would protect employees from retaliation as long as
the government pursued the complaint. Firms with any
sophistication would not punish a whistleblower during a
pending case; they would punish later. In this event, courts
would have to stretch minimally to apply the obstruction
statute in the whistleblower context because most firms
probably would not try to punish a whistleblower while the
SEC is engaged in “any investigation or judicial or
administrative action of the Commission based upon or related
to such information.”79 They would wait until the action is
complete.
In trying to avoid liability for punishing whistleblowers,
firms could argue that obstruction and tampering statutes do
not apply because the firms’ retaliation occurred after the
administrative or judicial action. The obstruction statute,
relating to “any pending proceeding,”80 contemplates only
pending actions. In response, courts might graft onto § 1505, a
provision similar to that in 18 U.S.C. § 1512.81 Under § 1512
(e)(1), an official proceeding need not be pending or about to be
instituted at the time of the offense. Still, § 1505, the
tampering statute, does not contain a similar statutory
provision providing criminal liability for retaliation after the
action or proceeding has been completed. Even if § 1512
applied only to tampering instituted before and during an
action, not after, the government could argue that the
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012).
78. Id.
79. Dodd-Frank Act § 922(h)(1)(A)(ii), 124 Stat. at 1841.
80. 18 U.S.C. § 1505.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (2012) (tampering with a witness, victim, or an
informant).
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retaliation against the whistleblower was undertaken to
discourage future whistleblowers and future SEC actions.
Regardless, in most instances involving a whistleblower
under the Dodd-Frank Act, a firm and its agents could be liable
criminally under 18 U.S.C. § 1513 for retaliating against a
witness, victim, or an informant following a criminal action or
investigation.82 Section 1513(e) reads:
Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate,
takes any action harmful to any person,
including
interference
with
the
lawful
employment or livelihood of any person, for
providing to a law enforcement officer any
truthful information relating to the commission
or possible commission of any Federal offense,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than 10 years, or both.83
Conceivably, a Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower’s information
might not relate to a criminal offense or, if provided to the
SEC, be provided to a law enforcement officer, and thus §
1513(e), if interpreted strictly, would not apply. In practice,
however, the SEC will almost surely coordinate with the
Justice Department in any significant enforcement action.
Moreover, it is likely that most whistleblower information
would “relat[e] to the . . . possible commission of any Federal
offense.”84 In close cases, where there is a question about
whether the whistleblower reported to a law enforcement agent
about a possible criminal offense, and where the whistleblower
returned to work and experienced retaliation, the Justice
Department might read § 1513(e) broadly and initiate a
prosecution to promote the whistleblower provision in the
Dodd-Frank Act. Regardless of criminal statutes, through its
rulemaking authority, the SEC has determined that it will
have enforcement authority over retaliation claims. “Because
the anti-retaliation provisions are codified within the Exchange
82. 18 U.S.C. § 1513 (2012).
83. Id. § 1513(e).
84. Id.
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Act, [the SEC] agree[s] with commenters that [it has]
enforcement authority for [sic] . . . employers who retaliate
against employees for making reports in accordance with
Section 21F.”85 The whistleblower provision of the Dodd-Frank
Act86 will probably result in a larger number of cases being
brought under the FCPA.
E. Extraterritoriality of Bribery Law
But the larger number of FCPA cases is only in relation to
the paltry number of cases brought by the SEC prior to the
Dodd-Frank Act. From 2004 to 2010, the number ranged from
three to twenty-three.87 Commentators have complained that
U.S. regulators take a broad view of the elements of the FCPA
and thus make enforcement of it easier.88 They argue that the
FCPA’s “domestic concerns” sweep up “[a]ny non-U.S. company
with a subsidiary incorporated under U.S. law;” that “issuer”
“means that any non-U.S. companies with stock traded on U.S.
stock exchanges or with securities subject to filing
requirements with the SEC” and is thus very inclusive; that
firms can be liable not only for officers, directors, and
employees but also for agents; and that, “possibly most
troubling, the FCPA applies to any person or entity, regardless
of whether it fits into any of the definitions described above,
that violates the FCPA within the territory of the United
States.”89 Indeed, the global criminal jurisdiction of the United
States continues to expand. The Dodd-Frank Act provides the

85. Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Dodd-Frank Act Release No. 34-64545,
at 18 (May 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/34-64545.pdf
(section 21F being the SEC rule regarding whistleblowers).
86. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841
(2010).
87. Leslie R. Caldwell et al., The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) &
The Dodd-Frank Act, MORGAN LEWIS (March 8, 2011), http://www.morganlew
is.com/pubs/FCPAWebinar_Dodd-FrankAct_08march11.pdf.
88. David W. Simon & Alex Kramer, The US DOJ & SEC – Give’m an

inch and they take a mile, THEBRIBERYACT.COM (August 11, 2011, 2:32 PM),
http://thebriberyact.com/2011/08/11/the-us-doj-sec-givem-an-inch-and-theytake-a-mile.
89. Id.
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model.
For example, § 929P(b) defines extraterritorial
jurisdiction of the “antifraud provisions of the federal securities
law.”90
The concept of the extraterritorial jurisdiction of domestic
law was advanced further when the United Kingdom’s Bribery
Act took effect on July 21, 2011.91 The FCPA will have a
counterpart in Europe, thus reducing firms’ opportunity to
engage in regulatory arbitrage. Probably stronger than the
FCPA, the Bribery Act92 “has both a broader scope and
jurisdictional reach”93 than the FCPA and, according to the UK
Foreign Office, “will be relevant to any organization that does
business in the U.K. or with U.K. counterparties.”94 The
Bribery Act’s crimes include:
1. Active bribery: promising or giving a financial or
other advantage.95
2. Passive bribery: agreeing to receive or accepting
a financial or other advantage.96
3. Bribery of foreign public officials.97
4. The failure of commercial organisations to
prevent bribery by an associated person (corporate
offence).98
The Bribery Act provides for 10 years imprisonment and an
unlimited fine.99 Regardless of whether the FCPA or the
Bribery Act has greater extraterritorial jurisdiction, the
provisions together sweep broadly. Probably, almost every
large firm engages in some business in the UK or the U.S. and
would fall within at least one of the anti-bribery provisions in

90. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1864-65.
91. Klehm III, supra note 35, at 943.
92. Bribery Act 2010, ch. 23 (Eng.).
93. Westbrook, supra note 32, at 933.
94. Klehm III, supra note 35, at 943.
95. Bribery Act 2010, § 1 (promising or giving a financial or other
advantage).
96. Id. § 2 (agreeing to receive or accept a financial or other advantage).
97. Id. § 6.
98. Id. §§ 7, 8.
99. Id. § 11(1)(b).
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the FCPA or the Bribery Act.
With the moral force of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and
Development
(“OECD”)
Anti-Bribery
Convention100 providing “a broad definition of bribery. . . [and]
requiring countries to impose dissuasive sanctions and
committing them to providing mutual legal assistance,” 101 the
days of deducting bribes from income tax obligations have
ended.102 The global reach of national statutes is growing
longer and bribery is becoming more unacceptable. The
whistleblower provision in the Dodd-Frank Act extends the
reach of the FCPA to almost any of a firm’s employees who are
in positions to discover and report a securities violation. The
Dodd-Frank Act has a long arm.
III. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Bribery Act, and
Conflict Minerals
Through its whistleblower103 and conflict minerals104
provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act contains a pinch of foreign
policy105 that is seemingly outside financial regulation, but is
consistent with the FCPA, although such is not mentioned in
the Dodd-Frank Act.106 Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act
100. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.,
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm (last visited
September 12, 2015).
101. Stan C. Weeber, Anticorruption Litigation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE 15 (Margaret E. Beare ed., Sage
Publications, Inc. 2012).
102. Id.
103. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841
(2010).
104. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at § 1504(p) (disclosure of payments
by resource extraction issuers).
105. See generally John Burchill, Out of the Heart of Darkness: A New
Regime for Controlling Resource Extraction in the Congo, 10 ASPER REV. INT'L
BUS. & TRADE L. 99 (2010) (discussing the history of conflict in the Congo).
106. As one commentator has noted:
The Congo Conflict Minerals Act (CCMA), introduced on
April 23, 2009 by Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) (and
passed as part of the Dodd-Frank bill in July 2010), seeks
to intervene in the ongoing civil conflict in the eastern part
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requires “disclosure of payments by resource extraction
issuers.”107 The outward purpose of § 1504 is to require oil,
natural gas, and mining companies to reveal to the SEC
payments made to foreign governments for extraction of the
particular commodity.108 Its deeper purpose is to prevent
companies, through investing in oil, gas, and minerals, from
fostering on-going conflicts in Africa, mainly those originating
in the Congo, by paying for commodities controlled by the
combatants, and by bribing them.
The conflicts in Africa are supported by rival groups
trading in oil, gas, and minerals. The Foreign Office of the
United Kingdom reports that, in the Congo, non-state armed
groups and rogue brigades within the Congolese national army
are reportedly involved in the production and trade of conflict
minerals.109 With serious allegations of mining companies and

of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by mandating
disclosure to the SEC of chain-of-custody information
related to the extraction and processing of columbitetantalite (coltan), cassiterite and wolframite. These socalled ‘conflict minerals’ are mined in the eastern DRC, and
the proceeds from their eventual sale to electronics
manufacturers have been traced back to armed bands
operating in the region.
Daniel M. Firger, Note, Transparency and the Natural Resource Curse:
Examining the New Extraterritorial Information Forcing Rules in the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1069 (2010).
107. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at § 1504(q).
108. See Robert Percival, Global Law and the Environment, 86 WASH. L.
REV. 579, 632-33 (2011).
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act . . . has been a major
force in spreading respect for the rule of law in developing
countries. Enforcement of the FCPA makes it easier for
companies to resist solicitations for bribes and spreads
respect for legal norms throughout the supply chain of
multinational enterprises. The transparency provisions in
the Dodd-Frank Act are likely to bolster efforts by NGOs
and private companies to green supply chains and to spread
respect for legal norms such as the FCPA's prohibition on
bribery.
Id.
109. Conflict Minerals, FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
2013), https://www.gov.uk/guidance/conflict-minerals.
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traders directly dealing with armed groups in eastern DRC,
“international attention has been brought to bear on how
armed groups’ involvement in the production and trade of
minerals and other natural resources has become one of several
important financing sources sustaining conflict, insecurity and
human rights violations in parts of eastern DRC [Congo]”.110
The Dodd-Frank Act’s conflicts minerals provision requires
specific disclosures, such as a statement in an annual report
indicating payments made “to a foreign government or the
Federal Government for the purpose of the commercial
development of oil, natural gas, or minerals.”111
Section 1502(a)112 provides the rationale for the conflicts
minerals provisions: “It is the sense of Congress that the
exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict
characterized by extreme levels of violence. . .particularly
sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an
emergency humanitarian situation therein.”113 A “conflict
mineral” is “columbite-tantalite (coltan), cassiterite, gold,
wolframite, or their derivatives . . . or . . . any other mineral or
its derivatives determined by the Secretary of State to be
financing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or
an adjoining country.”114 The countries adjoining Congo are
Central African Republic, Sudan, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi,
Zambia, and Angola.115
The Dodd-Frank Act and the FCPA are being used by
Congress to address problems far deeper and more serious than
bribery116 and books and records violations.117 The laws are the
110. Implications of Conflict Mining, http://computingissuescomp1220uwi.
weebly.com/implications-caused-by-conflict-minerals.html (last visited Oct. 4,
2015).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at § 1504(q)(2)(a).
Id. § 1502(a).
Id.
Id. § 1502(e)(4)(A)-(B).

Advisory, New Corporate Social Responsibility Requirements: DoddFrank Act Mandates Disclosure to SEC of Payments to Foreign Governments
and Use of Minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Arnold &
Porter L.L.P., (Aug. 2010), http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/
Advisory-New_Corporate_Social_Responsibility_Requirements_081310.pdf.
116. FCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
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levers to lift the lid off corporate payments for conflict minerals
to warring factions who use the payments to purchase
weapons. It is true that under the Dodd-Frank Act issuers
have to keep records beyond those required by the FCPA,
although the requirement does not seem overly burdensome.
In an annual report, companies must include:
[I]nformation relating to any payment made by
the resource extraction issuer, a subsidiary of the
resource extraction issuer, or an entity under the
control of the resource extraction issuer to a
foreign government or the development of oil,
natural gas, or minerals, including. . .the type
and total amount of such payments made for
each project.118
Central Africa is a relatively undeveloped region, where Congo
has great quantities of natural resources, “including large
deposits of gold, copper, zinc, tantalum (extracted from coltan),
tin, cobalt, and diamonds,” and a staggering estimate of $24
trillion in total mineral wealth.119
“Notwithstanding the
country’s vast natural resources and mineral wealth, the DRC
is one of the poorest countries in the world, with [a] per capita
. . . income of . . . $171 in 2009.”120 In such a relatively
unregulated, rich environment, bribery and corruption can be
endemic.
A sober question is whether the FCPA’s prohibitions on

117. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881, § 13,
invalidated by Nat’l Ass’n Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
118. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at § 1504(q)(2)(A).
119. John Burchill, supra note 105, at 99-100 (2010). Also adding that:
Currently 74% of all cobalt mined in continental Africa (49%
of all production worldwide) comes from the DRC; 69% of
tin; roughly 50% of all tantalum; 17% of all copper; 11% of
zinc; and 2% of all gold also comes from the DRC. Exports in
these minerals from the DRC were estimated to be $ 6.59
billion in 2008, up significantly from 2006.
Id.
120. Id. at 108-09 (citations omitted).
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bribery, as well as the requirements of the FCPA and DoddFrank to keep books and records and to disclose payments
regarding conflict minerals, can make significant headway into
the violence in Africa. Militias fight over such conflict minerals
as copper, gold, zinc, tantalum, tin, cobalt, and diamonds, and
they work to control “mines and taxation points inside Congo –
estimated to be in the hundreds of millions of dollars in 2008
alone.”121 The challenges in the Congo stem from a century of
unremitting violence.
From 1885 until 1908 King Leopold II of Belgium
ran the ‘Congo Free State’ as his own private
business interest, turning the local inhabitants
into slaves to harvest rubber and ivory for his
personal benefit. Pursuant to vast and exclusive
concessions issued to business interests
controlled solely or jointly by the King. . .the
inhabitants were subject to sadistic beatings,
dismemberment, and torture in order to extract
these resources with little or no compensation. It
has been estimated that as many as ten million
died under Leopold’s rule and that the
population of the Congo was reduced from ‘20-30
million. . . at the beginning of the colonial era to
8.5 million [by] 1911’ (citations omitted).122
Today, life is not much better. It is estimated that five million
people have died from conflict and forty-five thousand more die
each month in the Congo.123 The Dodd-Frank Act and the
FCPA may have some, albeit small, salutary effect on limiting
the violence that is, in part, impelled by payments from outside
the country.
IV.

Conclusion: Finding and Proving Bribery

National regulatory regimes in the United States and
121. Id. at 108.
122. Id. at 104-05.
123. Id. at 108.
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United Kingdom have begun to exert additional, significant
extraterritorial jurisdiction, with an enhanced and sharper
focus on specific financial functions of corporations, firms, and
individuals. While not specifically broadening the FCPA, the
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower-reward and conflict-mineralsreporting-requirement provisions will increase the likelihood of
bribery prosecutions and books-and-records enforcements
actions under the criminal and civil provisions of the FCPA.124
The SEC has not yet implemented the conflicts minerals
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act125 – and, like the accounting
and records provision in the FCPA,126 the conflict minerals
provision provides no criminal sanction for companies that use
the minerals .127
But the conflict minerals provision’s disclosure-ofpayments requirement permits greater public scrutiny,
allowing “nam[ing] and sham[ing]” of companies that use
conflict minerals.128
Significantly, the conflict-minerals
disclosure mandates a trail of documents whose creation
depends on corporate conversations and investigations.129
These can provide compelling evidence of bribery in FCPA
prosecutions. The Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provision
greatly increases the likelihood that some person in what is
now a much longer train of documents and conversations will
come forward and provide information. More people will create
more information and additional people will have access to it.
In sum, a disclosure requirement and rewards for
whistleblowers make bribery convictions more likely through
the addition of evidence and through the liability and
subsequent cooperation that may occur when witnesses and
insiders lie about130 or cover up131 matters related to an
124. See FCPA, Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
125. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §§ 1502(p), 1504(p).
126. See FCPA, supra note 29.
127. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §1504(p).
128. Marcia Narine, Dodd-Frank and Conflict Minerals- Can a
Governance Disclosure Eliminate Rape, Corruption and Child Slavery in the
Democratic Republic of Congo- Part 1, CONGLOMERATE, (Dec. 6, 2011),
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2011/12/dodd-frank-and-conflict-mineralscan-a-governance-disclosure-eliminate-rape-corruption-and-child-sla.html.
129. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §§ 1502(p), 1504(p).
130. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1621 (2012) (regarding false statements and
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investigation.
Where the FCPA’s accounting and records provision
requires more general information for investors, such as
“books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail,
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions
of the assets of the issuer,”132 the conflict-minerals provision is
aimed at more specific disclosures. An issuer must disclose
payments “to a foreign government or the Federal Government
for the purpose of the commercial development of oil, natural
gas, or minerals, including . . . the type and total amount of
such payments.”133 Perhaps the greatest utility of the DoddFrank Act’s whistleblower134 and conflict-minerals135 provisions
is that they buttress the criminal bribery provisions in the
FCPA136 and the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act.137 The bribery
provisions in the FCPA138 and the Bribery Act139 are similar in
that they prohibit improper quid pro quo agreements.
However, the Bribery Act’s provisions are considerably broader
and more detailed than the prohibited agreements in the
FCPA, which generally prohibits bribing foreign officials, but
does not prohibit “bribing” foreign private citizens.140

perjury, respectfully).
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (2012) (regarding obstruction of criminal
investigations).
132. FCPA, supra note 29.
133. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §1504(q)(2)(A).
134. See Dodd-Frank Act § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841.
135. Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 9, at §§ 1502(p), 1504(p).
136. Which states:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer . . . to make use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any
money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of
the giving of anything of value to . . . any foreign official
for purposes of . . . influencing any act or decision of such
foreign official.
FCPA § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1494.
137. See Bribery Act 2010, ch. 23, § 2(1)-(8) (Eng.).
138. See FCPA §103(a), 91 Stat. 1494.
139. Bribery Act 2010, §§ 2(2), 4(1).
140. See FCPA §103(a), 91 Stat. 1494.
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The Bribery Act prohibits improper quid pro quo
agreements141 relating to “foreign public officials”142 and,
broadly, bribery where the “function or activity relates” to “(a)
any function of a public nature, (b) any activity connected with
a business, (c) any activity performed in the course of a
person’s employment, [and] (d) any activity performed by or on
behalf of a body of persons (whether corporate or
unincorporate).”143 Under the Bribery Act, it is questionable
whether even the payment of “grease” – permitted under the
FCPA as a payment to a government official to expedite a
routine government action144 – would be permissible. But from
the United Kingdom’s perspective on the Dodd-Frank Act,
“[g]iven the current lack of Government capacity to
enforce/monitor systems in countries like the DRC [Congo], it is
likely that effective maintenance and oversight of these
schemes will, in practice, become the responsibility of
companies that have an interest in maintaining them.”145
Thus, a broad bribery statute is more justified given the
difficulty of regulating corporations in foreign nations.
The United Kingdom’s rationale for the Bribery Act, a lack
of resources and the difficulty of monitoring corporate behavior
in foreign nations, is perhaps the primary justification for the
Dodd-Frank Act’s reward system for whistleblowers and
conflict-minerals disclosure requirement for firms. Firms will
have greater costs because they will have to improve their
compliance culture and defend against even erroneous
whistleblower complaints. It will also be more costly to
investigate and disclose information about payments regarding
conflict minerals.
But, without compulsion, the FCPA
prosecutions and enforcement actions have been few. In the
141. Bribery Act 2010, § 6(1)-(8).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 3(1)-(7).
144. FCPA § 103(a), 91 Stat. 1494 (“[T]his section shall not apply to any
facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official, political party, or
party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance
of a routine governmental action by a foreign official, political party, or party
official.”).
145. Adrian Ladbury, Supply chain risk in spotlight as new SEC rules
target central Africa-analysis, COMMERCIAL RISK EUR. (Nov. 29, 2011),
http://www.commercialriskeurope.com/cre/1077/63/Supply-chain-risk-inspotlight-as-new-SEC-rules-target-central-Africa-analysis/.
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end, the heavy government thumbs in the United States and
United Kingdom are represented by the bribery provisions in
the Bribery Act and FCPA. Corporations and their employees
want to keep a safe distance from these statutes. The safest
response is for firms to work harder to eliminate bribery.
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